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Introduction
In December 2019, people in Wuhan, a major city of 11 
million people in central China, were found to be infected 
by a new coronavirus that may cause severe acute 
respiratory disease. At first, the Chinese government kept 
the virus secret from the world until it rapidly spread in 
Wuhan causing tens of thousands of people to become sick, 
many of whom died. On 23 January 2020, at 2:00 am, the 
Chinese government announced that they were closing the 
city at 10:00 am. Fearing being locked in the city, an 
estimated five million Wuhan residents fled (First Caijing, 
2020). Many of them were infected, hence beginning the 
great spread of the virus worldwide.
By April 2020, the virus, which is named COVID-19, 
rapidly spread in the world. While the final body count is 
still growing, at the writing of this article (22 April 2020), 
already over 2.6 million were infected and more than 
180,000 died. In merely three months, the world has 
witnessed the collapse of healthcare systems. The economic 
consequences that have followed have few modern 
parallels, and governments of all nations are facing a 
mounting, grave challenge that is unprecedented.
The crisis has put the governments of all infected 
nations in a spotlight in terms of how they responded. At 
first, most people in the world, especially in the 
democracies, put the blame on the authoritarian government 
of China for suppressing the information on the outbreak. 
By mid-March, the Chinese government declared that its 
military-style measures of closing cities had stopped the 
spread, and opinions in the democracies began to change. 
A commentary in Bloomberg suggested that the Chinese 
model of containment is superior to the democratic one 
(Brands, 2020). Another article at CNN mused on how 
Russia, with a population of 146 million, has fewer 
coronavirus cases than Luxembourg (Ilyushina, 2020). Yet 
another CNN article praised the ‘success of China’s 
sweeping, top-down efforts to control the virus’ (Westcott, 
2020). A National Review article concludes that ‘for the 
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This change of opinions raises an urgent and 
important question on the regime type and responses to 
COVID-19 (Alon & Li, 2020), and a more general, 
fundamental question on how we should respond to the 
criticism of, or dissatisfaction toward, democracy 
within the democracies, and their citizens’ preferences 
for a more authoritarian government for its perceived 
decisiveness and efficiency?
In this perspective essay, we will examine the responses 
to COVID-19 by the two major opposing types of political 
systems: democracy versus authoritarianism. We will 
present the cases of responses by China, the WHO and by 
some democracies.
We will use the qualitative method to build our arguments. 
Specifically, we adopt a multi-case qualitative approach 
following Eisenhardt (1989). This enables us to follow a 
replication approach wherein the insights from each case can 
confirm or refute inferences from the others. We further use 
Mill’s Similar System Design in order to directly compare 
China to Taiwan (Mill, 1843). A comparison of China’s 
response to Taiwan’s provides us with this ‘most similar 
research design’ popular with comparative political scientists 
(e.g., Teune & Przeworski, 1970). The two governments 
have ruled separately since 1949 but share a common history, 
culture and language. Differences in responses can be 
attributed to differences in governance. Furthermore, we use 
anecdotal evidence, reports, statistics, and government 
documents and policies to support our arguments. We also 
use scholarly sources to bolster our view.
COVID-19 and Crisis Management
By most definitions, crises are temporally limited events 
that, while important, do not constitute the bulk of our 
existence. Crisis in business is a disruption or problem that 
triggers negative reaction and impacts financial wellbeing 
(Kádárová, 2010). The Chinese phrase for crisis, wéijī (危
机), consists of two ideographs: danger and opportunity. 
The current COVID-19 crisis presents us with both and 
gives us an opportunity to examine the differences in policy 
responses between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
The COVID-19 crisis is, at the time of this writing, 
relatively new and an ongoing situation. As such, scholarly 
publications regarding the nation-level response to the 
pandemic are few. Nonetheless, some researchers have 
established recommendations for dealing with the novel 
coronavirus at the governmental level. For instance, 
several have emphasized the need for cooperation. In 
Africa, the early formation of the AFTCOR taskforce 
helped to spread testing capabilities. Prior to the 
establishment of the taskforce, only 2 countries in the 
entire continent were capable of testing for COVID-19; 
afterwards, and as a result of its actions, 40 countries were 
able to contribute to testing efforts (Nkengasong & 
Mankoula, 2020). This need for cooperation exists not 
only at the national but also subnational level. For 
example, physicians in the USA have emphasized the need 
for cooperation among states. States are bidding against 
one another for supplies, which does not necessarily send 
the supplies to the states which need them but to those 
which can afford them. This inefficiency may exacerbate 
the spread of the disease in the long term (Ranney et al., 
2020). In addition to echoing the call for international 
cooperation, Phelan et al. (2020) note that mandatory 
lockdowns are somewhat authoritarian in nature: They 
have the potential to erode public trust and may also 
violate human rights such as freedom of movement.
In examining national responses to the novel coronavirus, 
other researchers have noted historical parallels with past 
epidemics. While some of the negative elements, such as a 
slow initial response, are typical of how epidemics have 
been dealt with historically on a national level, other items 
are more promising, such as the success of quarantines in 
mitigating disease spread and mortality (Jones, 2020).
Theoretical Conceptualization and 
Considerations: Crises and Regime 
Type
Following Linz (1964), we refer to governments as 
‘authoritarian’ when (a) they offer no or very limited 
political pluralism, (b) obtain legitimacy through appeals 
to emotion and present the regime as a solution to easily-
identified societal problems, (c) suppress anti-regime 
sentiment and/or activities and (d) have broadly-defined 
powers that can be changed at will. Democracy, similarly, 
has four key elements: (a) the voters are represented by 
officials chosen through free and fair elections, (b) citizens 
are permitted to participate in the political system, (c) 
human rights of the citizens are protected and (d) the rule 
of law is enforced and laws apply equally to all citizens 
(Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Although this definition is 
closer to that of a republic than a ‘pure’ Athenian democracy, 
it is suitable for a discussion in terms of the Manichean 
authoritarian/democratic dichotomy.
In democracies, policies reflect inputs and balances of 
different constituencies; mistakes can be corrected through 
elections and public debates; information is freely flowing 
and, due to transparency and competition on the media 
market, the quality of public information is higher. 
However, their pluralistic nature tends to make their policy 
process slow (Li, 2009).
In authoritarian regimes, policy process is opaque and 
mainly reflects the ruling class’s views. There are no 
formal channels to effectively correct mistakes. Due to the 
lack of free flow of information and lack of media 
competition, public information is of low quality and 
untrustworthy, and people rely on private messages and 
rumours for information. Due to the lack of checks and 
balances and the lack of public debates, policy process can 
be fast (Li, 2009).
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Political science research suggests several avenues in 
which democratic systems may be overarchingly preferable 
to others. For example, democracies, in general, tend to 
have fewer civil wars, fewer wars with each other and 
fewer wars overall (Hegre, 2001; Ray, 2003). Democratic 
regimes are also less likely to kill their own citizens (i.e., 
democide; Rummel, 1997). Political institutions found in 
democracies are more likely to positively influence the 
prevalence of corruption, such as freedom of the press or 
parliamentary systems (Lederman et al., 2005). 
Democracies also suffer fewer terrorist attacks and fewer 
casualties in those attacks, possibly due to greater concern 
over citizen safety and wellbeing (Magen, 2018).
Obviously, framing the debate as being one between 
authoritarianism and democracy neglects alternative causal 
explanations and abandons nuance regarding classification 
of systems in favour of a binary oversimplification of 
reality. While type of government certainly influences 
policy which in turn affects crisis response, other factors, 
such as cultural frequency of gatherings, could play a 
significant role (Maçães, 2020). For example, incorporating 
Hofstedian cultural dimensions into our discussion might 
also help us understand the responses of different countries 
to a crisis such as the new coronavirus outbreak versus 
solely examining purely political factors. Specifically, the 
contrast between individualism and collectivism can 
provide insights in this regard, since collectivist societies 




In 2002 and 2003, China had its first outbreak of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) caused by a coronavirus 
in Guangdong Province in the south. This is believed to 
have originated in bats and spread to humans via civets 
(Quanlin, 2006).
After the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government 
spent about $100 million to set up ‘the largest system in 
the world’ for a ‘direct-reporting network for infectious 
diseases and sudden public health events’. It was promised 
that using the system, any doctor at the lowest level would 
be able to directly report signs of the disease outbreak to 
the central government in real time (Chinese Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2019; Cidiwuyan, 2020).
In 2015, Shi Zhengli, a virologist at the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology, co-authored an article that warned of viruses 
similar to that responsible for the SARS circulating among 
the Chinese bat population that may pose a serious future 
threat (Nandi, 2020).
For the remainder of this section, we discuss that threat 
and how events have unfolded. See Table 1 for a brief 
timeline of the early stages of the crisis.
Table 1. Timeline of Major Events: Early COVID-19 Crisis
Dates (All Dates 
2020) Event Notes
31 December The CCP begins censoring relevant terms from 
social media.
A day later, authorities force Dr Li Wenliang to write a 
self-criticism.
6 January The CDC issues a travel advisory for Wuhan 
province.
11 January The CDC tweets about a pneumonia outbreak in 
China related to coronavirus.
14 January The WHO tweets that there is no evidence of 
widespread human-to-human transmission of the 
novel coronavirus.
The tweet cites a preliminary investigation by Chinese 
authorities.
17 January The CDC begins screening travellers from China. These screenings are limited to a mere 3 airports.
21 January The first case is reported in the USA from someone 
who travelled directly from Wuhan.
23 January Chinese authorities lock down Wuhan. This comes a mere 20 days after scientific research on 
the virus is banned and samples are ordered destroyed.
27 January The WHO raises the alert level while still claiming 
that China has the virus contained.
28 January The CDC states that risk in the USA is considered 
low.
29 January The White House announces the creation of the 
Coronavirus Task Force.
On the same day, the WHO continued to downplay the 
threat of the novel coronavirus.
31 January President Trump bans all travel from China. On the same day, China criticized the USA for the 
travel warning as ‘mean’ (Reuters, 2020).
On 3 February, the WHO urged countries not to close 
borders to foreigners from China (Schlein, 2020).
(Table 1 Continued)
Alon et al. 155
Dates (All Dates 
2020) Event Notes
12 February The CDC continues to wait for Chinese approval to 
send a team to the country.
21 February The CDC tweets that it is working with states to 
prepare. Italy announces its first case.
29 February The first death from the virus is reported in the 
USA.
Source: Compiled by authors.
(Table 1 Continued)
In December 2019, people in Wuhan were found to be 
infected by a new coronavirus that may cause severe acute 
respiratory disease. Some of the early patients visited the 
Huanan Wild Animal and Seafood Market. Doctors in 
Wuhan warned their family and friends about the disease 
but they were reprimanded and even arrested. The best-
known doctor among them is the late Dr Li Wenliang, who 
was arrested for warning others and later died of the virus. 
Some official doctors tried to report it to the central 
government but were warned by their supervisors to be 
‘cautious in reporting’. Fearing being punished, they did 
not report. Evidence shows that the central government 
learned of it in early January but it decided to keep the 
information from the public.
By mid-January, the virus had rapidly spread in 
Wuhan. On 23 January 2020, 2:00 am, the Chinese 
government announced the closure of the city at 10:00 
am. Fearing being locked in the city, an estimated five 
million Wuhan residents fled (First Caijing, 2020). Many 
were infected, hence beginning the great spread of the 
virus worldwide. Soon after, virtually all cities and 
villages in China were closed.
In February 2020, some reported that Remdesivir, a 
drug developed by the US company Gilead Sciences, might 
be effective in fighting the virus. Soon after these reports, 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology applied for the patent on 
the use of Remdesivir in China. This act was criticized as 
unethically profiting from the outbreak (Ye, 2020).
On 27 February, Zhong Nanshan, the prominent Chinese 
infectious disease expert with the highest political position 
in the Chinese government, questioned the common 
knowledge that the virus originated in Wuhan: ‘The 
infection was first spotted in China but the virus may not 
have originated in China’. Soon after, a senior Chinese 
official, Zhao Lijian, claimed on Twitter (which is banned 
by the Chinese government in China): ‘It might be the US 
army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan’ (Westcoot & 
Jiang, 2020).
According to a The New York Times report, ‘Russia and 
China, as well as Iran, have sharply increased their 
dissemination of disinformation about the coronavirus 
since January, even repeating and amplifying one another’s 
propaganda and falsehoods, including anti-American 
conspiracy theories’ (Barnes et al., 2020).
Around mid-March, the Chinese government began to 
claim that Wuhan had achieved ‘zero cases’. However, 
information leaked from China shows that that may not be 
true (Bloomberg, 2020b). One report—which has been 
repeatedly deleted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and reposted by others—described a patient being rejected 
by several hospitals in Wuhan so the CCP could maintain 
their ‘zero cases’ records due to pressure from the higher-
ups for propaganda purposes (New Tang Dynasty 
Television, 2020). Beijing and Shanghai, along with some 
other regions, bar Wuhan, Hubei people who are officially 
cleared of the virus, indicating that the authorities of other 
regions do not believe the ‘zero cases’ claim by Wuhan, 
Hubei (Radio France Internationale, 2020).
In late March, the Chinese government finally allowed 
families to retrieve the ashes of their loved ones who died 
during the outbreak in Wuhan under tight security. The 
families must be accompanied by local officials to retrieve 
the ashes, and they were not allowed to cry or show any 
grief. According to the official report, the total deaths due 
to the virus in Wuhan is 2,535 (which was later adjusted to 
3,869 by the Chinese government; Page & Fan, 2020). But 
based on the large number of urns distributed to the official 
cremation service stations, which, by one estimate, is 
64,000, the death toll due to the virus is much higher. 
Assuming normal deaths during the period to be 5,000, 
then the actual number of coronavirus-related deaths is 
59,000 in Wuhan. Projecting to the whole country, the 
actual numbers of confirmed cases and deaths in China 
should be 1.2 million and 97,000, respectively (Bloomberg, 
2020a; Caijing Lengyan, 2020).
Aside from the evidence that the number of cases and 
deaths may be underreported, the definition of confirmed 
cases China uses is different: China only counts people 
with symptoms, whereas the rest of the world count people 
who tested positive regardless of whether they show 
symptoms. Logically, the number from China is lower 
because many infected people do not show symptoms.
Taiwan’s Reaction
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan showcase efficient 
democratic responses to the crisis. Italy and the USA were 
slow initially but caught up quickly through travel 
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restrictions, quarantines and social distancing measures. 
Taiwan’s reaction was exemplary and can be used to 
contrast with China’s as they share many of the same 
characteristics such as culture and ethnicity, with the key 
difference being that Taiwan has vibrant democratic 
institutions. The island is only 81 miles away and shares a 
common history with the mainland. Taiwan was well 
positioned to handle the crisis as it has had experiences 
with misinformation from China as well as previous 
exposure to SARS which allowed them to build a national 
early warning system. Although we are not the first to use 
these factors to compare China to Taiwan (e.g., Li, 1989); 
to our knowledge, this method has not been used in the 
context of the present pandemic.
On 31 December, Chinese officials notified the WHO of 
several cases of pneumonia, alerting Taiwan Centers for 
Disease Control to monitor passengers arriving from 
Wuhan. Suspected cases were immediately screened for 26 
different viruses. By mid-January, Taiwan sent a team of 
experts to China, prompting the rapid establishment of a 
Central Epidemic Command Center and stopping all flights 
from Wuhan by 26 January. Simultaneously, the 
government distributed 6.5 million masks, 84,000 litres of 
hand sanitizer and 25,000 forehead thermometers. 
Combining surveillance technology in airports, big data, 
health data and tracing technology, the government took 
fast action to stymie the spread (Scher, 2020). Transparent 
and open communications, a feature of democratic 
countries, allowed Taiwan’s response to be more effective 
and less invasive than China’s.
This openness has not only benefitted Taiwan but also 
the rest of the world. Taiwan has freely shared its 
experiences and advice for fighting the pandemic. In 
contrast, China continues to obfuscate and distort available 
information. For example, the CCP has recently ordered 
that all research into the origins of the virus must be 
approved by the party (Gan et al., 2020), hampering future 
efforts towards preventing the spread of a similar epidemic.
Taiwan has also been successful in rapidly implementing 
strict control measures—which are supposedly one of the 
advantages of authoritarianism. Taiwan has successfully 
rationed masks while repurposing private production in 
order to more than quadruple the amount available. As we 
have previously noted, Taiwan’s government was rapid in 
implementing a travel ban from China and Hong Kong, 
and also monitors its citizens to ensure the effectiveness of 
quarantine efforts. Simultaneously, and unlike authoritarian 
regimes, Taiwan quickly produced a welfare programme 
for affected citizens, incentivizing them to honestly report 
symptoms and enabling them to live at home without fear 
of starvation (Yang, 2020).
As a result of their reaction, Taiwan government did not 
suffer a loss of legitimacy, protected its citizenry and has 
earned a special place as ‘a nation-state’ among observers 
of the disease. Its subjugation in international organizations 
should be reexamined because it is a risk to not only its 
own statehood but also the health of the global political 
economy—and, quite literally, the health of the globe. 
Although it has been excluded from the WHO due to 
pressure from China, Taiwan has been more effective in 
limiting the virus’ spread (Yang, 2020).
The WHO’s Response
The head of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, is 
from Ethiopia, a country that took large amount of financial 
aid and investment from China. He and the WHO played 
along with the CCP to mislead the world. China’s increased 
involvement in Ethiopia is part of an assertive diplomatic 
and economic relationship building in Africa, including the 
exchange of infrastructural improvements for natural 
resources and political support (Adem, 2012). Africa is an 
integral part of China’s expansionism through the Belt and 
Road Initiative (Zhang et al., 2018). China endorsed 
Ghebreyesus to head the WHO and the relationship 
between these two organizations is now under a microscope.
The first fatal error made by the WHO was by tweeting 
on 14 January 2020 that ‘preliminary investigations 
conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear 
evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel 
coronavirus’ assuring the world that a rapid and radical 
response to contain the virus was unnecessary. This was at 
a time when the Chinese government already knew the 
disease was spreading. Why did the WHO not conduct its 
own due diligence? Was the WHO fulfilling its mission?
The second gigantic error by the WHO was their 
dismissive attitude towards Taiwan, who forewarned the 
WHO of the novel coronavirus at the end of December 
2019. Taipei reported that they had isolated the infected 
patients for treatment, implying human-to-human 
transmission of the virus, to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), an organization under the WHO with a 
task of preventing epidemics from spreading. This warning 
was not shared with other countries (Manson, 2020). 
Taiwan is not an official member country in the WHO 
because China forbids it from being recognized as a separate 
nation-state. The WHO chose to ignore this warning in 
favour of official reports from the Chinese government 
stating that the virus was not transmissible interpersonally.
The third fatal error that the WHO has made is that it did 
not declare COVID-19 as a pandemic until 11 March 2020, 
well after it was generally already recognized as having all 
the traits of a pandemic. The delayed announcement by the 
WHO has delayed appropriate government responses to 
the global crisis and has accounted for numerous lives lost. 
A big question mark rises over the WHO’s relationship 
with China as well as its effectiveness as an international 
organization.
The failure of the WHO will be investigated in detail in 
the months and years ahead. Particularly vexing is the 
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WHOʼs links to the CCP and how the latter influenced it 
through reciprocal relations, exchanges of favours and 
financial commitments.
Discussion
The Political System and Response 
Effectiveness
Why did China’s alerting system fail? Why were the 
doctors who alerted others punished by the Chinese 
government? To answer these questions, we need to look 
more closely at how the CCP was founded and how it is 
run. The CCP is founded on communists’ conviction that 
they are the only ones who know the destiny of humankind, 
and they have the mission to lead humankind to reach that 
destiny—communism. Unlike democracy, in which 
officials are elected by voters, the legitimacy of communists’ 
rule comes from the use of violent force and its insistence 
on its own infallibility, which requires it to censor all 
criticism and deprives people of their voting power (Li & 
Alon, 2020). The central government appoints the heads of 
provinces, who in turn appoint the heads of cities. In such 
a system, officials of every level answer only to the officials 
of upper levels. They all serve the most important goal of 
the party: keeping it in absolute power. To get promoted, 
officials must keep their superior happy, only tell the boss 
good news and suppress anything, decisively, that may 
cause instability, such as disease outbreaks.
In a democracy, locally elected officials are responsible 
to the people who elected them or else they lose their jobs. 
Thus, if there is a new, fast-spreading disease, they must 
quickly react to protect their constituencies by letting the 
world know so that their people and region can get help. 
While democracies are not immune to complacency or 
incompetence, they do have one feature that authoritarians 
do not: accountability to the people.
The relative success of Taiwan, Korea and Japan shows 
that the accountability to the people in democracies is key, 
democracies are not intrinsically inferior to authoritarians 
in crisis response and that it does not require a dictatorship 
to be efficient and effective.
Other Factors That May Explain 
Differences in Response
As we mentioned earlier, focusing the debate on regime 
type as the main explanation of crisis response must also 
consider other factors such as culture (Maçães, 2020). In 
this respect, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
2015), especially the individualism versus collectivism 
dimension, may offer a powerful explanation on the 
differences in effectiveness of response between Asian 
countries, which emphasize collectivism, and Western 
countries, which champion individualism. It has been 
observed that East Asian countries tend to respond to the 
outbreak more effectively than the West, regardless of their 
different political systems. This implies that culture may be 
a powerful explanation factor for the effectiveness of 
response by different nations. While culture is not our 
focus, it needs to be further studied.
Further, existing political structures might be adapted to 
service the conditions brought about by the virus. In the 
same way that democratic regimes sometimes have 
authoritarian features (and vice versa), measures deemed 
politically undesirable in the long term but urgently needed 
in the short run might be undertaken. For example, the 
USA has sought to deal with the crisis by temporarily 
granting indefinite detention powers to the Department of 
Justice. Although this would constitute a democratic 
country taking an arguably authoritarian course of action, 
the realities of combating COVID-19 might mean that 
idealism will take a backseat to pragmatic actions in the 
short run (Swan, 2020).
The evidence we have presented indicates that 
authoritarianism is not a prerequisite in dealing with the 
coronavirus or other crises. The token efforts of authoritarian 
regimes to peddle influence through donations of supplies 
do not counteract their negative impact on the world, 
including calling into question the WHO’s objectivity and 
ability to prepare member states for the crisis.
Policy Implications: What Can Democracies 
Improve?
Nevertheless, if being a democracy were a cure-all, there 
would have been no bungled responses in democratic 
states. It is a favourite tactic of CCP apologists to cite tu 
quoque red herrings in an effort to deflect criticism 
(Economist, 2020), which would seem to be an odd strategy 
for a regime which views its own actions as defensible. 
However illogical the technique, their points might be 
somewhat valid in the case of the coronavirus crisis, as 
democracies have not been unimpeachable in their 
response. We offer suggestions below as to how 
democracies as a whole might improve their responses to 
crises moving forward.
The first phenomenon that needs to be rethought is 
directly related to the efficiency of the response. 
Undoubtedly, from an economic point of view, efficiency 
and equality (or individual rights) are inherently 
contradictions. Governments in democratic countries must 
engage within the scope of law and cannot rely on 
unrestricted powers as in authoritarian countries, which 
routinely infringe upon individual rights and pursue a 
single goal that the government deems important regardless 
of social costs. This institutional constraint of democracies 
has caused many inconveniences in rapidly responding to 
disasters. However, this inconvenience should not be used 
as an excuse for sluggish action because in response to 
disasters such as wars and plagues, the governments of 
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democratic countries should have the power to declare a 
state of emergency and even expropriate social and civilian 
assets for quick responses.
Of course, when a democratic country requisitions 
civilian resources and restricts citizens’ rights, the 
government needs to have a reasonable explanation for 
society, and it should also compensate affected citizens 
afterwards according to law. It is relatively easy to 
implement a state of emergency in a state of war because 
the enemy’s aggression against the country is the best 
explanation and reason for mobilization of the people. But 
it is much more difficult for politicians to persuade citizens 
to respond quickly to the beginning of an infectious disease 
because it is often difficult to see the serious consequences 
of an outbreak. Regardless of calculations based on 
ignorance, short-sightedness and personal interests, the 
slow and even wrong decisions of the general public, 
especially politicians, will bring disaster to the entire 
society. The slow response of politicians in Italy, Spain, the 
United States and other countries to the epidemic has 
already brought heavy costs to the country and the world.1 
How to reduce partisan gridlock when dealing with large-
scale social disasters in the policy process is a topic that 
democratic societies should examine.
Second, this crisis shows the vulnerability of the open 
society in democracies to an expansive authoritarian power 
in the world. We need to rethink how to protect our ways of 
life from dictatorships such as China, as our societies, 
especially our borders, are open to them. In this sense, 
democracies should learn a deeper lesson from this disaster, 
that is, national borders cannot limit the calamities that 
totalitarian systems bring to humankind. We must realize 
that the pursuit of power by an authoritarian regime is not 
bounded by its national border, not only in terms of their 
military and economic expansion but also in terms of their 
domestic disasters, which, as we have seen in the pandemic, 
can easily transcend national boundaries. A consensus that is 
being formed in this crisis is that the CCP’s stifling of 
freedom of the press, and concealment of the epidemic, are 
the initial cause of the spread of the new coronavirus 
epidemic. The outbreak clearly reminds every democracy in 
the world that trying to coexist peacefully with dictatorships 
and ignoring their violations of civil rights is extremely 
short-sighted. The democracies must realize that supporting 
the people in dictatorships for their quest for human rights 
and the rule of law is not merely a charitable action but the 
first line of defence for the democracies themselves.
Third, unlike the several international financial and 
economic crises in the past, humankind is currently facing 
triple crises: First, it is a humanitarian crisis and people are 
greatly afraid of the uncertainty of the spread of the 
epidemic. In democracies, politicians are also naturally 
distrusted by voters in responding to the crisis. This 
increases the difficulty of implementing any policies. 
Second, this is also a financial and economic crisis. Unlike 
before, this time the crisis is simultaneous in both supply 
and demand. These factors hamper the effectiveness of 
existing monetary and fiscal policy instruments and will 
also increase the long-term side effects of these policies. 
Finally, the crisis is also a showdown of the two 
fundamentally different political and economic systems. 
The authoritarian system hopes to use this crisis to further 
weaken the democratic system. On the one hand, the 
Chinese government is trying to cover up its mistakes, and 
on the other hand, it falsely publicizes its so-called 
institutional advantages. Ultimately, the triple crises lead to 
the most challenging crisis of all: The lack of world 
leadership among the democracies to formulate and 
execute concerted efforts to deal with the crises unseen.
Concluding Remarks
The COVID-19 crisis is a truly pivotal moment in modern 
history. The economic and health consequences are far 
reaching but it also represents a possible shift in the world 
order that will potentially be in favour of authoritarianism 
(Maçães, 2020). While facing the danger that democracies 
might lose out in the battle for hearts and minds worldwide, 
the opportunity exists for democratic countries to embrace 
this challenge and move the world away from authoritarian 
systems, who, as we have shown, are not by systemic 
design better-suited for this crisis. In fact, their upward 
accountability systems may mean that crises are allowed to 
balloon to an unmanageable size before the ruling entity is 
forced to admit to and address them. As we see in the 
pandemic, the decisiveness of the dictatorship in 
implementing a coverup has turned a local infectious 
disease into a global pandemic and then their equally rapid 
effort to lock down the entire nation has resulted in huge 
sacrifices and economic costs.
Thus, for the democracies, the pandemic provides a 
window for us to fight back, an opportunity for us to 
recognize the shortcomings of our institutions, an 
opportunity to face up to our internal problems and improve 
governance and state capacities; it is also an opportunity to 
recognize the true nature of the authoritarian system, and 
therefore an opportunity to deal with it with a long-term 
goal in mind: protecting the democratic system and our 
way of life worldwide.
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Note
1. Their inadequate response, to a great extent, is the result of the 
effort by the Chinese government and the WHO to downplay 
the seriousness, scope and speed of the infection.
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